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Résumé   
Au cours de ces dernières années, le Nigéria a été confronté à une rébellion armée dans les trois 
Etats du nord-Est, Adamawa, Borno et Yobe. Le 14 mai 2013, le gouvernement avait déclaré un 
état d’urgence dans ces trois Etats et rapidement pris des mesures pour faire face à la situation. 
Depuis lors, de nombreux discours et commentaires publics ont été entendus sur l’état 
d’urgence au Nigéria. A partir d’une approche descriptive et d’une analyse profonde des 
sources secondaires, cet article examine la politique d’état d’urgence déclaré dans le nord-est du 
Nigéria. En adoptant la théorie du jeu comme cadre théorique, les auteurs affirment que la 
manière dont les pouvoirs d’urgence ont été exercés était déterminée par des impératifs 
politiques plutôt que sécuritaires. Ils recommandent la création d’une force de police d’Etat 
dont les Gouverneurs devraient être les véritables chefs comme premiers responsables de 
sécurité de leurs Etats respectifs. D’autre part, le Président devrait exercer les pouvoirs 
d’urgence concurremment avec les Gouverneurs des Etats avec l’implication des responsables 
locaux des entités concernées.  
Abstract 
In recent years, Nigeria has been facing an armed insurgency in the three north-eastern States, 
namely Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. On 14 May 2013, the government declared a state of 
emergency in these three States and swiftly put in place operational measures to counter this -
insurgency. Ever since there has been a deluge of discourse and public commentaries on the 
state of emergency in Nigeria. Adopting a narrative descriptive approach and an extensive 
analysis of the secondary sources, this article interrogates the politics of the state of emergency 
declared in Northeast Nigeria. Adopting the game theory as theoretical framework, the author 
argues that the way emergency powers have been used in Nigeria suggests more of politics than 
the issue of national security. He calls for the creation of state police force under the authority 
of State Governors as the real Chief Security Officers of their respective states. Moreover, the 
President should exercise emergency powers concurrently with States’ Governors without 
neglecting the local leaders of the concerned entities.  
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Nations, all at once, are plagued by a lot of new, multifaceted threats, menaces, 
agitations and challenges, such as unprecedented upsurge in international 
terrorism, ecological calamities resulting from climatic change, pandemics, 
large-scale organized crime, colossal human displacements bringing about 
unusual population upsurge across borders and severe humanitarian crisis, 
insurgency and so forth (Adebisi, 2013:2). One of such challenges governments 
of many nations are faced with, in particular that of developing world, is that of 
insecurity. Most often, huge of capital, material and human resources were 
being expended to secure their nations from both internal violence and external 
aggression (Idowu, 2012:69). 
In Nigeria, the return to democracy in May 1999 started amidst great 
hope and expectations of development and political stability. However, the last 
decade has experienced an increase in violent conflicts and criminality, which 
likely to undermine those expectations. The violence and criminality include 
armed robbery, drug trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping, arms 
smuggling and militancy among others. The violent activities of armed non-
state actors, mostly consist of radicalized youth groups as foot soldiers, has 
greatly threaten the nation’s internal security. Popular among these groups are 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the O’Odua 
People’s Congress (OPC), the Arewa People’s Congress (APC), Bakassi Boys, 
Egbesu Boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of 
Biafra (MASSOB), and more recently, Boko Haram, Ansaru, ‘Kala-Kato’, 
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In recent years, Nigeria has been confronting an armed insurgency in the 
three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe that make up the northeastern 
geopolitical zone, with the population of about 13 million people. The activities 
of the sect have led thousands of people in the northeast displaced. On 14 May 
2013, the Government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in these three 
States and immediately put in place viable means for a counter-insurgency 
operation in order to curtail the heinous crime of the sect. Sadly enough, the 
emergency rule declared did not put an end to the sect’s nefarious activities 
such as bombings, killings, kidnappings and the destruction of property. On the 
contrary, the attacks of the sect during the period exceeded when there was no 
state of emergency (Awojobi, 2014:147; Onah, 2014:64). Ever since, there has 
been series of debate and public commentaries over the legality and 
constitutionality of the state of emergency itself, its purport and intent. It is 
against this backdrop that this paper interrogates the politics of the state of 
emergency declared in Northeast Nigeria. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
This study adopted the game theory as its theoretical framework. Game theory 
is used in analyzing key interplays. At any time, the choices made by two or 
more individuals have an effect on each other’s gains or losses, and henceforth 
their actions; the interplay between them is game-theoretic in nature (Morton, 
2017:1).  
Game theory is applicable to a wide range of political occurrences. For 
instance, inability to hold election in party A’s stronghold will increase the 
chances of party B winning, with the resultant effect on the possibility of party 
A losing. According to Plano, Riggs and Robbins (1982) cited in Adedayo 
(2016:138), game theory is a “body of thought dealing with rational decision 
strategies in situations of conflict and competition, when each participant or 
player seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses.” The idea of applying 
games theory to social science most especially in economics and politics 
surfaced in the early twentieth century. The earliest and one of the most 
methodical works on game theory, “Game of Politics: A Study of the Principles 
of British Political Strategies”, was published P. G. Cambray in 1932 
(Varghese, 2017:17). In 1943, Neumann and Morgenstern published “Theory of 
Games and Economic Behaviour” (Kay, 2005:4). Several scholars, such as 
Schelling, Riker, Kaplan and Raiffa also documented in extensive details the 
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Game theory is based on certain assumptions, which includes; (i) it 
assumed that there must be at least two players in any game, (ii) each player of 
the game is only interested in making decision that will be of benefit to him, 
(iii) in every game there is a tactic, which is determined by the player of the 
game, (iv) the players of the game are guided by rationality, and (v) the player 
is quite conscious of the alternatives that exist before him and he chooses one 
or two that he considers would offer him maximum pay-off (Burns and 
Roszkowska, 2005: 20,34; Tema, 2014: 2-3).  
Although the relevance of games theory is more prominent in 
international politics than in domestic politics, its applicability to domestic 
politics is not in doubt since international politics is an extension of domestic 
politics. Its application to this work is appropriate, since much of politics have 
to do with the allocation of scarce resources, such as power and wealth, and the 
competition for these resources, a whole lot of politics evidently will be 
appropriate for the language of game theory. 
 
Methodology  
The adopted research methodology was a desktop research, where information 
was obtained from books, journals and newspapers relevant internet sources. 
The data were subjected to substantive and extensive analysis through the 
instrumentality of content validity, content analysis and textual criticism to 
establish facts that defend or refute the hypothesis.  
With content validity, data collected reflect the issue under research and 
ensure that key related subjects are not excluded. The content analysis 
examined the presence of words or phrases in a text in order to identify the 
specified characteristics of messages and to make meaning of them. With 
textual criticism, literature works were verified and synthesized to determine 
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State of Emergency  
Nations will at some period be faced with severe crisis conditions, such as 
terrorism or other kinds of severe social mayhems, and such a situation may 
necessitate regulating the enjoyment of individual rights and freedoms or even 
suspension of their enjoyment completely. Different terms are been used by 
states to describe the special legal order introduced in emergency situations 
such as a “state of alarm”, “state of exception”, “state of tension”, “state of 
siege”, “state of necessity, “marital law”, “state of emergence” and so forth 
(Nwoke, 2013:275).  
State of Emergency has been variously defined, capturing different 
elements that create room for the emergence of this phenomenon. A state of 
emergency simply put therefore is a governmental declaration that 
acknowledges the existence of this unusual situation and takes some necessary 
actions to restore the peace and governmental stability of the society (Richie, 
2011: para 1). A publication of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces on “State of Emergency” conceptualized it as follows: 
 
A state of emergency derives from a governmental declaration made in 
response to an extraordinary situation posing a fundamental threat to the 
country. The declaration may suspend certain normal functions of government, 
may alert citizens to alter their normal behavior, or may authorize government 
agencies to implement emergency preparedness plans as well as to limit or 
suspend civil liberties and human rights. The need to declare a state of 
emergency may arise from situations as diverse as an armed action against the 
state by internal or external elements, a natural disaster, civil unrest, an 
epidemic, a financial or economic crisis or a general strike (Backgrounder, 
2005:1).  
 
Generally, state of emergency has been defined by the Chambers 20th 
Century Dictionary cited in Oniha (2014:2) as “the suspension of normal law 
and order procedures and the introduction of strict controls of the population, 
which usually involves the military, so that a crisis, revolution, etc can be 
contained”. While these various definitions and analytical backgrounds give 
insight into the understanding of state of emergency, it is important to examine 
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State of Emergency: The Nigerian Experience  
History of emergency rule in Nigeria is closely linked to the colonial 
connection between her and Great Britain.  One unique feature of the colonial 
administration was the emphasis placed on public order and state security 
(Idowu, 2012:75).  The governor has the power to make a formal proclamation 
that will make the provisions of order-in-council to become operational in the 
entire country or any part of it, if he was satisfied that a public emergency 
existed. This power, according to Nwabueze (1974:305), was put to use to a 
certain extent between 1946 and 1960. During the period, there were twenty-
nine emergency declared in different parts of the British colonies ranging in 
length from a few days to months or several years (Nwabueze, 1974:305). 
Meanwhile, state of emergency had been declared in the Independent Nigeria 
on five major occasions. The first was in the former Western Region in 1962. 
The second was in Plateau State in 2002. The third was in Ekiti State in 2003. 
The fourth was a series of emergency rule declared on a number of Local 
Government areas in Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger States and the fifth was 
declared in three northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. Historical 
antecedents of each declaration shall be examined. 
 
Western Nigeria, 1962  
State of emergency was first proclaimed in the independent Nigeria in 1962 
when the crisis within the Action Group grew into a feud between the young 
radicals led by Awolowo and the businessmen led by Chief Akintola (Aluko, 
2004: para 3). With a vote of 81 to 29, decision for Akintola’s dismissal from 
the party and his resignation as the premier was taken which he (Akintola) 
declined to accept instead he filed a suit against the action.  
Without waiting for the court’s decision, the Governor went on to 
remove him and sworn in Alhaji D.S. Adegbenro as the Premier of Western 
Region. Thereafter, Alhaji Dawodu Soroye Adegbenro formed a cabinet, which 
was sworn in May 23 (Ojiako, 1981). On May 29, 1962, as a fallout, the Prime 
Minister, Sir Abubakar in the Federal House in Lagos, in pursuance of section 
65 of the Constitution of the Federation moved a motion for the declaration of 
state of public emergency in the Western Region of Nigeria, the resolution of 
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After given historical reasons why he thought those present should 
support his motion, the motion was passed by 32 in support, 7 against and 2 
abstentions. With the passage of the motion, the Federal Government took over 
the administration of Western Nigeria. The Governor General promulgated 
series of Emergency Powers Regulations on the same day, and Senator the Hon. 
Dr. Moses Adekoyejo Majekodunmi was appointed the Administrator of 
Western Nigeria (Udoma, 1994; Aluko, 2004: para 3).   
 
The Plateau State Experience of Year 2004 
The protracted boundary disputes and ethno religious disturbances majorly 
between Christians and Muslims in Yelwa, Langtang, Shendam and Wase 
Local Government areas of Plateau State resurface in September 2001. The 
parties from time to time took on each other in fierce battles between 2001 and 
2003. The situation which gotten worsened by February 2004, came to a peak 
on May 2, 2004 resulting from violent attacks on inhabitants of Yelwa which 
resulted in the death of about 200 peoples while several houses were set on fire. 
In response to the incident, President Olusegun Obasanjo embarked on a 
working visit to the troubled region and the internally displaced camps on May 
13, 2004 (Idowu, 2012:75-76; Ostien, 2009:14). 
The agony of the internally displaced persons (IDP) seen by the 
President, as well as what he described as the inability and incompetence of the 
Governor to maintain security of life and property in the state (particularly in 
the affected areas), prompted the invocation of Section 305 of the 1999 
Constitution by the President to declare a state of emergency in Plateau State on 
the 18th day of May 2004 (Obasanjo, 2004: 2).  
The President also sacked the incumbent Governor Joshua Dariye for 
failing to act to end the series of the violence. He blamed him for the continuing 
violence, in Obasanjo’s word, “If anything, some of his utterances, his 
lackadaisical attitude and seeming uneven handedness…over the contending 
issues present him as not just part of the problem, but also as an instigator and a 
threat to peace” (Obasanjo, 2004, para. 4).  In addition, the President dissolved 
the Plateau State House of Assembly and appointed retired General Chris Ali as 
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Emergency Rule in Ekiti State in 2006 
Aluko in a paper titled “the state of emergency in Ekiti State and the 
Nebuchadnezzar non-option” give a very detailed events leading to the 
declaration of the state of emergency from which an extract shall be made for 
this study. 
According to Aluko (2006: para 1-11), Ekiti State House of Assembly 
members on the 26 September 2006 passed a motion to serve a notice of 
impeachment on the Ekiti State governor Mr. Peter Ayodele Fayose and his 
deputy on allegation of gross misconduct. The governor in an effort to stop the 
impeachment process filed an ex-part motion in an Ado-Ekiti court. However, 
on October 16, the House Assembly, after receiving the Aladejana panel report 
and calling for a vote, formalized the impeachment of Fayose and his deputy. 
The acting judgeship of Aladejana, who immediately proceeded to swear in the 
Speaker as Acting Governor was also formalized by the house.  
The unseated deputy governor Olujimi filed a suit at an Ado-Ekiti High 
Court challenging her removal from office, now claiming to be Acting 
Governor on behalf of her “impeached” Governor, whose whereabouts she said 
she knew not. The deposed governor also spoke to a Lagos TV channel from 
his hideout, laying claim to his governorship seat. With three claimants to the 
Ekiti state governor’s seat, the ground was prepared for eventuality. 
All of the above actions culminated in a state of emergency being 
declared by President Olusegun Obasanjo on Thursday, October 19. President 
Obasanjo announced the appointment of an ex-military person, Tunji Olurin, as 
“Sole Administrator” of Ekiti State. At the end of the six months period of the 
emergency rule in Ekiti State on April 18, 2007 president Obasanjo extended 
the emergency rule to last till May 29, 2007 (Aluko, 2006: para 12). 
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The surge of terrorist acts by the dreaded group called Boko Haram became 
more worrisome by the year 2011 with the massive destruction of lives and 
property through bombing of innocent civilians, mosques, churches, police 
stations and public buildings (Amaechi, 2013:142-143). In the wake of 
worsening insecurity, that follows the Christmas Day bombings at Madalla, 
Niger State, Church of Christ in Nigeria Headquarters bombing in Jos, and 
another in Damaturu in Yobe State, on December 31, 2011, partial state of 
emergency was declared in 15 local government councils spread across the 
states of Plateau (four), Niger (one), Yobe (five) and Borno (five) by President 
Goodluck Jonathan (Nnamdi, 2013:101).  
Consequently, the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No 38 of 
12 May 2012 was published (Idornigie, 2013:392-393). However, the federal 
government lifted the state of emergency on Wednesday July 19, 2012, 
following a review of the security situation in the affected 15 local government 
areas. This, according to the Attorney General of Federation Mohammed 
Adoke, is to enable the Government to put in place appropriate confidence 
building measures to improve security in the affected areas. 
Emergency rule in 3 North Eastern states (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) – 
2013 
The Northern part of Nigeria is in crisis. With northeast geo-political zone, 
constituting six states; Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Taraba 
states, most affected in the Boko Haram activities since the year 2009 (Caleb 
and Hapsatu Mohammed, 2016). Lately it evolved into pure terrorism, with 
students attending secular state schools, health workers involved in polio 
vaccination campaigns and villager supporting the government as targets. 
(African Report, 2014; Caleb and Hapsatu Mohammed, 2016). On May 14, 
2013, President Goodluck Ebelle Jonathan in a nationwide television broadcast 
announced the ‘declaration’ of state of emergency in the three northern states of 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states (Alemika, 2014). Declaring the state of 
emergency, the President stated as follows:  
Following recent developments in the affected states, it has become necessary 
for Government to take extraordinary measures to restore normalcy. After wide 
consultations, and in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the provisions of 
Section 305, sub-section 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
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Accordingly, the Chief of Defense Staff has been directed to immediately 
deploy more troops to these states for more effective internal security operations. The 
troops and other security agencies involved in these operations have been orders to 
take all necessary actions, within the ambit of their rules of engagement, to put an end 
to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists. This will include the authority to arrest and 
detain suspects, the taking of possession and control of any building or structure used 
for terrorist purposes, the lock-down of any area of terrorist operation, the conduct of 
searches, and the apprehension of persons in illegal possession of weapons.( Jonathan, 
2013, para. 12-14). The emergence rule was twice extended after the first 6 
months expiration. The third attempt by the president to extend it was rejected 
by both chambers.   
 
 
State of Emergency in Nigeria: Between Politics and Constitutionality  
The provision of the constitution on declaration of a state of emergency is very 
explicit in section 305 of the 1999 constitution. The incidents that can lead to 
such declaration are also clear and unambiguous. That which may seems a little 
contentious is paragraph (d) of subsection 3 where there is “a clear and present 
danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety”. Even though 
the Nigerian constitution made provision for the use of emergency powers but 
the way it has been used in Nigeria suggested more politics than the issue of 
national security (Mbah, 2014).  
In the assertion of Uchechukwu (2013:236), dated back to the first 
Republic, declaration of a state of emergency in any part of the country carried 
with it some elements of politics – it is been seen as an opportunity by the 
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In an attempt to capture the politics that came to play in the state of 
emergency declared in the Western Region by the Balewa administration (in the 
first republic) Mbah (2014) has this to say: 
 
The declaration of state of emergency was predicated on the fact that the 
ruling party, NPC which also controlled the Federal Government, had 
no political hold on the Western Region since the alliance between it 
and the NCNC has been strained and broken up. The NPC after the end 
of the six months that the emergency rule lasted reinstated S.L. Akintola 
as the premier of the Western Region. However, at this time, Chief 
Awolowo who was the leader of the AG, was charged with plotting to 
overthrow the Federal Government and sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment. On his return to power, Akintola formed a new party 
known as the United Progressive Party (UPP) and later the Nigerian 
National Democratic Party (NNDP). Akintola and the NNDP depended 
on the Federal Government for its survival and obliged the Federal 
Government by approving the legislation for the creation of the Mid-
Western Region in 1963 (2014: 590). 
He submitted further: 
 
The chief beneficiary, however, of the power play was the NPC which 
used it to strengthen its political balance. After the state of emergency 
had been declared or even at the end of it, it would have been possible 
to hold an election in order to decide which of the parties or factions had 
the support of the electorate. This was not done. On the contrary, the 
emergency lasted for six months, and when it was finally lifted, Chief 
Akintola was reinstated Premier of the Western Region. And so, on June 
3, 1963, the Federal Parliament approved the amendment to the 
constitution of Western Nigeria, consequently confirming Akintola in 
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During the regime of Obasanjo, state of emergency was declared in 
Plateau and Ekiti States. Both the way and circumstances surrounding the 
declarations raised many unanswered constitutional questions. One of such 
question was whether Section 305, which confers on the President the powers to 
declare a state of emergency, also empowered him to remove a democratically 
elected Governor and elected members of the State House of Assembly 
(Uchechukwu, 2013:237). However, that which is central to this work is the 
politics that underscored the declaration. This Aniebo Nwanu cited in 
Uchechukwu (2013:.237) sum up as follows: …Obasanjo woke up one day and 
declared a state of emergency in Plateau State because he wanted to get at a 
political opponent. He did the same in Ekiti State because of one man.     
Likewise, Nwabueze (2007) opined that the use of state of emergency 
by President Obasanjo in Plateau and Ekiti states were an abuse of power, 
brought about for political reasons, and not in conformity with the spirit and 
letter of the constitution. In his words: 
 
…despite this when the ‘push came to shove’ in Plateau and Ekiti States they 
were ignored because the motives behind the declaration were vengeance and 
settlement of political scores (2007:201). 
While the need for President Jonathan’s declaration of state of 
emergency in the 15 local government councils cannot be in doubt. It was 
indeed a great relief to many and source of hope that perhaps, the end of the 
expensive attack on the Nigerians was imminent. Mbah (2014) traced the 
politics underlying the declaration to the internal politics within the then ruling 
People Democratic Party. 
The emergency rule declared by President Goodluck Ebelle Jonathan on 
May 14, 2013, in the three northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe 
states was never a strange one.  However, to Oniha (2014:1), Jonathan departed 
from the precedent by allowing the state officials in the affected states to 
continue in office. As in the past though, the motive were not vindictive, there 
were a lot of political coloration to the declaration. The All Progressives 
Congress (APC) - the main opposition party then, accused President Goodluck 
Jonathan and his party of plotting the state of emergency in order to scuttle the 
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According to the National Chairman of the APC (John Odigie-Oyegun), 
the desperation of President Goodluck Jonathan to be re-elected seems to 
inform it, in order to make conduct of elections in the affected region 
impossible, knowing full well the region are APC strongholds (National Mirror, 
2014). 
The Jama’atu Nasril Islam, JNI, also accused President Goodluck 
Jonathan and his government of been behind Boko Haram attacks to enforce 
emergency rule. In a statement by its Secretary General, Khalid Aliyu, the 
group said it has observed a trend of increase in Boko Haram attacks whenever 
the federal government seeks an extension of emergency rule in the three North 
Eastern states affected by the insurgency (Odunsi, 2014: para 4). In Adibe’s 
(2014: para 3) opinion, the politics of extending emergency rule in Adamawa, 
Borno and Yobe states is rooted in a range of conspiracy theories about Boko 
Haram. Opponents of President Jonathan in the North believe the emergency 
rule was a deliberate plan to either depopulate the north ahead of the 2015 
elections or a source of primitive accumulation for several people close to 
power at Abuja. Meanwhile, to the proponents of the extension, those who are 
opposed to it have secret agenda of either abetting Boko Haram or want to see 
President Jonathan humiliated. 
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
It is evident from the above that the use of state of emergence in Nigeria as a 
tool to deal with security challenges by the president has been full of difficulties 
- its motives had always been questionable, the one declared in the North east is 
also not an exception. Added to this, is the cooperation of the state or local 
government under emergency rule, which is very critical to its success, is often 
lacking. Consequently, recommendation is made for the creation of state police 
force where the State Governors will be the actual Chief Security Officers of 
their respective states. Otherwise, emergency powers should be exercised by the 
President concurrently with the Governor of the affected states and the Local 
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